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Section 704
Section 704(a)1 provides that a partner's share of income, gain, loss,
deduction or credit shall, except as otherwise provided, be determined by the
partnership agreement. 2 Under §704(b), however, the Internal Revenue Service will
respect allocations of partnership tax items of income, gain, deduction and loss only
so long as (i)they have "substantial economic effect", or (ii)taking into account all
facts and circumstances, they are in accordance with the "partner's interest in the
partnership" ("PIP").3

All section references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
or the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.
2

For purposes of this outline, the term "partnerships" shall include general partnerships, limited partnerships,

limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies and all other entities classified as partnerships for tax
purposes under §301.7701-3 of the Treasury Regulations.

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(i)(iii), however, reminds us that allocations respected under §704(b) nevertheless
may be reallocated under other provisions such as §§482, 704(e)(2) and 706(d).

The §704(b) Safe Harbor
To have substantial economic effect, allocations must have "economic
effect" and that economic effect must be "substantial". 4 To have "economic effect"
under the primary economic effect test, (i) the partnership making the allocations
must maintain capital accounts according to the provisions in the Treasury
Regulations; (ii) the partnership must liquidate according to those capital accounts;
and (iii) if a partner has a deficit capital account balance upon liquidation, the partner
must be obligated to restore its deficit balance or the partnership must satisfy an
alternate test described below. 5 This economic effect test is designed to result in tax
allocations that are consistent with the underlying economic arrangement of the
partners.
Example 1. A and B form AB Partnership. A contributes $90x to AB
Partnership and B contributes $10x to AB Partnership. Under the AB
Partnership Agreement, A and B agree to divide profits and share
losses equally. The AB Partnership Agreement also provides for
(i) the maintenance of partner capital accounts consistent with the
Treasury Regulations; (ii) liquidating distributions to partners according
to positive partner capital account balances; and (iii) deficit capital
account restorations by all partners upon partnership liquidation.
Inthe first year of the partnership, the partnership experiences a $20x
loss. Under the primary test for economic effect described above, the
allocation of this loss $1Ox to A and $1Ox to B should be respected for
tax purposes. In the partnership's second year, AB Partnership once
again experiences a $20x loss. Once again, this time particularly
4

Treas. Reg. §1,704-1(b)(2)(i).

5

Treas. Reg. §1,704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).

because of the deficit capital account restoration provision in the AB
Partnership Agreement, the equal allocation of this loss between A
and B should be respected for tax purposes notwithstanding the
creation of a negative capital account for B. If the AB Partnership
Agreement did not contain a deficit capital account restoration
provision, however, the allocation of any additional loss to B after the
partnership's first year will not have economic effect and therefore will
not be respected. Indeed, because B will not bear the economic
burden of additional losses after AB Partnership's first year, the entire
second year loss must be allocated to A under PIP.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in Example 1 above, except
that A and B agree that losses will be allocated entirely to B
notwithstanding B's relatively small capital contributions. As a result of
this arrangement, the loss of $20x in AB Partnership's first year will be
allocated entirely to B under the AB Partnership Agreement. Because
B is subject to a deficit capital account restoration provision upon the
liquidation of B's interest in AB Partnership, this allocation will have
economic effect and should be respected for tax purposes. As a result
of the allocation, B's capital account will be reduced from $10x at the
beginning of AB Partnership's first year to ($10x) at the end of AB
Partnership's first year. Further, because of the deficit capital account
restoration provision, B will have to contribute an additional $1Ox to AB
to restore B's deficit capital account if A and B liquidated AB
Partnership at the end of AB Partnership's first year.
Example 3. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that A
and B agree that all AB Partnership depreciation will be allocated to B
notwithstanding B's relatively small capital contribution. Thus, unlike
Example 2 above, A and B agree to specially allocate an item of
expense as opposed to a "bottom-line" loss amount. Nevertheless,
because the AB Partnership Agreement requires capital account
maintenance, liquidation according to positive partner capital account
balances and deficit capital account restoration upon liquidation, the
allocation of all AB Partnership depreciation to B will have economic
effect. On the other hand, if the AB Partnership Agreement did not
contain the provisions described above, the allocation of all AB
Partnership depreciation to B would be reallocated between A and B
based on PIP.

Under an alternate test for economic effect, allocations will be
respected if (i)the allocations satisfy the first two requirements of the economic
effect test described above; (ii)no allocation is permitted to decrease a deficit
balance in a partner's capital account below the amount the partner is obligated to
restore (or is deemed obligated to restore) upon a liquidation of the partnership or
upon a liquidation of the partner's interest in the partnership; and (iii) the applicable
partnership agreement contains a "qualified income offset".6
For purposes of this alternate test, a partnership agreement contains a
"qualified income offset" if, and only if, it provides that a partner who unexpectedly
receives an adjustment, allocation or distribution that drives the deficit balance of its
capital account below the amount the partner is obligated to restore (or deemed
obligated to restore) will be allocated items of income and gain (including gross
income) in an amount and in a manner sufficient to eliminate such excess deficit
balance as quickly as possible.7 Because partners generally do not wish to expose
themselves to the economic risk of having to restore a deficit capital account upon
liquidation, most partnerships seeking to satisfy the substantial economic effect safe
harbor attempt to satisfy the alternate test (that is,the test without the deficit capital

6

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(2)(ii)(d).

7

Id.

account restoration obligation) as opposed to the primary test (the test with the
deficit capital account restoration obligation).
Example 4. The facts are the same in Example 1 above, except that
instead of having a deficit capital account restoration provision in the
AB Partnership Agreement, A and B install (i)a provision limiting the
ability of either partner to receive loss allocations that would result ina
negative capital account in excess of a partner's actual or deemed
obligation to restore a negative capital account; and (ii)a "qualified
income offset" requiring AB Partnership to make gross income
allocations to any partner who unexpectedly receives loss allocations
or distributions that result in a negative capital account in excess of its
actual or deemed deficit capital account restoration obligations. Under
these facts, the AB Partnership Agreement can satisfy the alternate
test for economic effect described above. As a result, the loss
allocations to A and B inAB Partnership's first year will have economic
effect and should be respected. The loss allocations in year 2 can
also be respected. However, the reason why the allocations in the
second year can be respected is that the AB Partnership Agreement
will allocate those losses entirely to A pursuant to the loss limitation
provision described in(i)above.
Allocations failing to satisfy the primary or alternate economic effect
tests described above may still satisfy the substantial economic effect safe harbor if
they have "economic effect equivalence." 8 Allocations have economic effect
equivalence to the extent that they would result each year in the partners receiving
the same amounts upon a liquidation of the partnership as they would receive if the
partnership actually satisfied the primary or alternate economic effect test. 9 Inother
words, if the otherwise non-qualifying allocations would not result in a different
S

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(i).
Id.

outcome upon a liquidation of the partnership, there is a no harm, no foul exception
for taxpayers.

This exception, however, has been referred to by leading

commentators as the "dumb but lucky rule" and should not be relied upon outside of
extraordinary circumstances.' 0
Example 5. A and B form AB Partnership and agree to divide profits
and share losses equally. A and B each contribute $50x to AB
Partnership. In AB Partnership's first year, the partnership incurs a
loss of $20x and allocates that loss $1Ox to A and $1Ox to B. AB's
Partnership Agreement, however, does not provide for the
maintenance of capital accounts, liquidations based on positive partner
capital accounts, deficit capital account restorations upon partnership
liquidation or a qualified income offset. Nevertheless, because AB
Partnership's $20x loss would have been allocated equally between A
and B if AB Partnership had actually satisfied either the primary or
alternate economic effect test described above, the equal allocation of
AB Partnership's $20x loss between A and B will have economic effect
equivalence and, therefore, should be respected.
As stated above, the second part of the substantial economic effect
test is the so-called "substantiality requirement".

Under the substantiality

requirement, an allocation will be respected as substantial if there is a reasonable
possibility that the allocation will offset substantially the dollar amounts to be
received by the partners from the partnership, independent of tax consequences."l
Nevertheless, an allocation will not qualify as substantial if, at the time the allocation
becomes part of the partnership agreement, (i)the after-tax economic consequences
10

See, e.g., McKee, Nelson and Whitmire, Federal Income Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, Third
Edition (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1997). Section 10.02[1] fn. 23.
Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(2)(iii)(a).

of at least one partner may, in present value terms, be enhanced compared to the
consequences if the allocation was not contained inthe partnership agreement; and
(ii)there is a strong likelihood that the after-tax economic consequences of no
partner will, in present value terms, be substantially diminished compared to the
consequences if the allocation was not contained inthe partnership agreement. 12 In
determining the after-tax economic benefit or detriment to a partner, tax
consequences that result from the interaction of the allocation with the partner's tax
attributes that are unrelated to the partnership are taken into account. 13
Inaddition to the general overall substantiality requirement described
above, the regulations governing the substantiality requirement set forth two
examples of transactions that fail the substantiality test.

First, the regulations

describe transactions that are referred to as "shifting allocations".14 Secondly, the
regulations describe a separate set of transactions referred to as "transitory
allocations".15
As to shifting allocations, the regulations state that allocations will fail
the substantiality test if,at the time they become part of the partnership agreement,
there is a strong likelihood that (i)the net increases and decreases that will be
12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Treas. Reg. §1,704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b).

15

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c),

recorded in the partners' respective capital accounts for such taxable year will not
differ substantially from the net increases and decreases that would be recorded in
the partners' respective capital accounts if the partnership agreement did not contain
the allocations, and (ii)the total tax liability of the partners (for their respective
taxable years inwhich the allocations apply) is less than if the partnership agreement
did not contain the allocations. If,at the end of a partnership taxable year to which
an allocation relates, the net increases and decreases that are recorded in the
partners' respective capital accounts do not differ substantially from the net
increases and decreases that would have been recorded insuch partners' respective
capital accounts had the partnership agreement not contained the allocation, and the
total tax liability of the partners is less that it would have been had the partnership
agreement not contained the allocation, it ispresumed that, at the time the allocation
became part of such partnership agreement, there was a strong likelihood that these
results would occur.16 This presumption may be overcome by a showing of facts and
circumstance that prove otherwise. 17
Example 6. A, an entity that is a tax-exempt under Section 501 (c)(3),
and B, a taxable entity, form AB Partnership and agree to be equal
partners. Based on AB Partnership's investments, A and B are certain
that AB Partnership will generate equal amounts of both tax-exempt
interest income and taxable interest income. A and B,therefore, agree
to allocate all of the tax-exempt interest to B (the taxable entity) and all
16

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(2)(iii)(b).

17

Id.

of the taxable interest to A (the tax-exempt entity). Under the AB
Partnership Agreement, (i)AB Partnership will maintain partner capital
accounts; (ii)AB Partnership will liquidate according to positive capital
accounts; and (iii) AB Partnership will be subject to a loss limitation
provision and a qualified income offset.
Because the AB Partnership Agreement contains the economic effect
safe harbor provisions described above, AB Partnership's allocations
of its tax-exempt and taxable interest will have economic effect.
However, because (i)the economic consequences to A and B with the
special allocations of tax-exempt and taxable interest in the AB
Partnership Agreement will not differ from the economic consequences
to the partners if the agreement did not contain the allocations; and
(ii)the total tax liability of the partners will be less with the allocations
inthan agreement than it would be if the agreement did not contain the
allocations, the allocations will fall within the description of "shifting
allocations" and, therefore, will fail the substantiality requirement. As a
result, the amounts will be reallocated between the partners based on
the PIP test. Under PIP, each partner will presumably receive equal
allocations of both AB Partnership's tax-exempt interest and taxable
interest.
As to transitory allocations, if a partnership agreement provides for the
possibility that an allocation will be largely offset by another allocation, and, at the
time the allocations become part of the partnership agreement, there is a strong
likelihood that (i)the net increases and decreases that will be recorded in the
partners' respective capital accounts for the taxable years to which the allocations
relate will not differ substantially from the net increases and decreases that would be
recorded in such partners' respective capital accounts for such years if the
partnership agreement did not contain the original allocation and offsetting allocation,
and (ii)the total tax liability of the partners (for their respective taxable years inwhich

the allocations will be taken into account) is less than if the partnership agreement
did not contain the allocations; the economic effect of the original allocation and
offsetting allocation will not be substantial. 18 If,at the end of a partnership taxable
year to which an offsetting allocation relates, the net increases and decreases
recorded in the partners' respective capital accounts do not differ substantially from
the net increases and decreases that would have been recorded in such partners'
respective capital accounts had the partnership agreement not contained the original
allocation and the offsetting allocation, and the total tax liability of the partners is less
than it would have been had the partnership agreement not contained such
allocations, it will be presumed that, at the time the allocations became part of the
partnership agreement, there was a strong likelihood that these results would
occur. 19 Similar to the shifting allocation presumption described above, this
presumption may be overcome by a showing of facts and circumstances proving
otherwise. 20
Example 7. A, a corporate entity with an expiring net operating loss,
and B, an individual, form AB Partnership. To allow A to take
advantage of its net operating loss before it expires, A and B agree to
specially allocate an amount of first-year income equal to the expiring
net operating loss to A. Further, in AB Partnership's second year, A
and B agree that AB Partnership will make a comparable special
allocation to income to B to offset the effect of the first year special
18

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(2)(iii)(c).

19

Id.

20

Id.

allocation to A. To ensure that neither partner will be economically
harmed, AB Partnership invests in assets that will generate sufficient
amounts of income in each of AB Partnership's first two years to
satisfy both special allocation amounts described above.
Under the AB Partnership Agreement, (i)AB Partnership will maintain
partner capital accounts; (ii)AB Partnership will liquidate based on
positive capital accounts; and (iii) the partners of AB Partnership will
be subject to a loss limitation provision and a qualified income offset.
Because the AB Partnership Agreement contains these economic
effect safe harbor provisions, the special allocations of income to A
and B will have economic effect. Nevertheless, (i)because the
economic consequences to A and B with the allocations (taking both
years into account) in the AB Partnership Agreement will not differ
from the economic consequences to the partners if the agreement did
not contain the allocations (again, taking both years into account); and
(ii)the total tax liability of the partners will be less with the allocations
than it would be without the allocations, the allocations will fall within
the description of "transitory allocations" and, therefore, will fail the
substantiality requirement. As a result, the amounts will be reallocated
between the partners based on PIP. Under PIP, each partner's
special allocation presumably will be ignored.
Notwithstanding the discussion above, the original allocation will not
be insubstantial (and therefore it will be presumed that there is a reasonable
possibility that the allocations will affect substantially the dollar amounts to be
received by the partners) if, at the time the allocations become part of the
partnership agreement, there is a strong likelihood that the offsetting allocation will
not, in large part, be made within five years after the original allocation is made.2 1
For purposes of applying these provisions, the adjusted tax basis of partnership
property (or, if partnership property is properly reflected on the books of the
21

/d.

partnership at a book value differing from its adjusted tax basis, the book value of
such property) will be presumed to be the fair market value of such property. This
final provision isoften referred to as the "value equals basis" rule. 22
The PIP Test
Ifallocations of items fail to satisfy the substantial economic effect test,
the government will reallocate the items to the extent necessary to correspond with
PIP. Under the PIP test, tax items are shared among partners based on their overall
economic arrangement, taking into account all facts and circumstances. 23 PIP
provides very few bright line rules. Nevertheless, if partnership allocations satisfy
the first two prongs of the economic effect test but fail to satisfy the third prong of
that test (relating to deficit capital accounts), the PIP test generally will determine a
partner's interest by comparing (a)the manner in which the partnership would make
distributions and receive contributions if it sold all of its property and immediately
liquidated following the end of the year with (b)the manner inwhich the partnership
would have made distributions and received contributions if it sold all of its property

22

Id.

23

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(3)(i). The PIP test begins with a presumption that all partner interests are equal on
a per capita basis. However, taxpayers or the government may rebut this presumption by establishing facts
and circumstances showing that a different result is appropriate, Note that recently proposed regulations
propose removing this presumption altogether.

-12-

and immediately liquidated following the end of the prior year, after making certain
adjustments. 24
Both the substantial economic effect test and the PIP test are intended
to match allocations of income and loss with economic benefits and burdens. Thus,
because both tests have the same ultimate objective, the PIP test will often place the
taxpayer in the same position it would have been in had it satisfied the substantial
economic effect test inthe first place. The substantial economic effect test, however,
provides taxpayers with the certainty of a safe harbor as well as the accompanying
benefits of other favorable rules. The PIP test, on the other hand, exposes
taxpayers to the unpredictability of a facts and circumstances test that very few tax
experts are comfortable applying. Based on the principles described above, many
taxpayers seek to satisfy the substantial economic effect test if they can. For the
reasons discussed immediately below, however, a growing percentage of taxpayers
do not concern themselves with satisfying the substantial economic effect test.
Indeed, although the substantial economic effect safe harbor clearly
provides taxpayers with the benefits of certainty, it often concerns taxpayers for at
least three major reasons. First of all, many taxpayers simply do not understand
capital accounts or the significance of income and loss allocations. Without this
understanding, they often have great difficulty signing documents overflowing with
24

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b)(3)(iii).

-13-

references to capital accounts and citations to the §704 regulations. In these
situations, taxpayers are likely to walk away from their transactions less than fully
satisfied, even if their transactions go forward.
Secondly, although taxpayers often do not understand capital
accounts, they often are comfortable with common corporate provisions. As a result,
they often prefer including the equivalent of corporation distribution provisions intheir
partnership agreements. The substantial economic effect test does not have a
corporate equivalent. Many taxpayers, therefore, may resist including language in
their agreements necessary to meet the test.

Instead, they will often lobby for

distribution provisions similar to those commonly found incorporate documents.
Finally, taxpayers typically do not want mistakes or unexpected
interpretations of the §704(b) regulations to alter their economic arrangement. If
capital accounts and allocations ultimately govern distributions, a mistake in making
allocations can have serious business repercussions. Further, if an unexpected
interpretation of the allocation regulations ultimately can affect the overall business
arrangement, partners seeking the benefit of the safe harbor effectively will permit
those with authority over interpreting those regulations (that is,the government or
the courts) to disturb their business deal.
In response to these concerns (as well as others), many partnership
agreements have adopted approaches allowing distributions of cash and property to

-14-

determine allocations of income and loss. These alternative approaches often will
not satisfy the substantial economic effect safe harbor and, therefore, will be subject
to the PIP test. Nevertheless, the approaches allow taxpayers to focus solely on the
distribution provisions of their agreements; provisions that they generally believe
they understand very well.

Further, these approaches often mirror common

provisions found in corporate documents. Finally, taxpayers often feel comfortable
that, under these alternative approaches, mistakes in making allocations or
unexpected interpretations of the allocation regulations ultimately will not affect their
economic results.
Nonrecourse Deductions
Special rules apply to losses and deductions attributable to partnership
nonrecourse liabilities (so-called "nonrecourse deductions"). Under the regulations,
allocations of nonrecourse deductions cannot have economic effect because the
nonrecourse creditor bears the economic burden that corresponds to such
allocations.25 Nonrecourse deductions, therefore, must be allocated according to
PIP.26 However, allocations of nonrecourse deductions will be deemed to be in

accordance with PIP if they satisfy a special safe harbor test. Otherwise, they will be

25

Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(b)(1).

26

Id.

reallocated to conform to the uncertainties of the PIP test based on all of the
applicable facts and circumstances.
The applicable safe harbor for nonrecourse deductions iscontained in
Treasury Regulation §1.704-2(e). Under that regulation, allocations of nonrecourse
deductions will be deemed to be inaccordance with PIP only if (i)throughout the full
term of the partnership, the partnership satisfies the first three requirements of the
economic effect test (that is, maintaining capital accounts, liquidating according to
positive capital accounts, and partners with deficit capital accounts agree to an
unconditional deficit restoration obligation or a qualified income offset); (ii)beginning
inthe first taxable year of the partnership inwhich there are nonrecourse deductions
and thereafter throughout the full term of the partnership, the partnership agreement
provides for allocations of nonrecourse deductions in a manner that is reasonably
consistent with allocations having substantial economic effect of some other
significant partnership item attributable to the property securing the nonrecourse
liabilities; (iii) beginning in the first taxable year the partnership has nonrecourse
deductions, and thereafter throughout the full term of the partnership, the partnership
agreement contains a minimum gain chargeback (described below); and (iv)all other
material allocations and capital account adjustments under the partnership
agreement are recognized under the Treasury Regulations.

-16-

For purposes of this requirement, partnership minimum gain equals
the aggregation of all partnership gain that the partnership will realize if it disposed of
all of its properties subject to nonrecourse liabilities.27 Further, for any partnership
taxable year, the net increase or decrease in partnership minimum gain is
determined by comparing partnership minimum gain on the last day of the
immediately preceding taxable year with partnership minimum gain on the last day of
the current taxable year.28
Example 8. A and B form AB Partnership as equal partners to
purchase an office building for rent. A and B each contribute $10x to
AB Partnership and AB Partnership borrows an additional $80x from
an unrelated bank on a nonrecourse basis to purchase a $100x office
building. For the sake of simplicity, assume (i)that the office building
is depreciable over 40 years; (ii)AB Partnership generates income
each year equal to all of its expenses other than depreciation; and
(iii) AB Partnership makes no principal payments on the nonrecourse
debt. Based on these assumptions, AB Partnership incurs a net loss
ineach year equal to its depreciation amount (that is,$2.5x per year).
During AB Partnership's first 8 years, its depreciation deductions
(which total $20x) will not qualify as nonrecourse deductions because
they will not reduce the basis of the office building (which is initially
$100x), below the nonrecourse debt which encumbers the building
(that is,$80x). Inyear 9, however, the basis of the office building will
be reduced from $80x to $77.5x while the nonrecourse debt
encumbering the office building remains at $80x. AB Partnership's
depreciation deduction in year 9, therefore, will be attributable to AB
Partnership's nonrecourse borrowing and will qualify as a nonrecourse
deduction. AB Partnership's minimum gain at the end of year 9,
moreover, will equal $2.5x (the minimum amount of gain AB
27

Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(d)(1).

28

Id.
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Partnership would recognize if the partnership sold or otherwise
transferred the office building inataxable transaction).
As described above, AB Partnership's depreciation deduction inyear 9
cannot have economic effect because the nonrecourse lender
ultimately bears the risk that the value of office building will not be
sufficient to satisfy the lender's debt amount. Nevertheless, if AB
Partnership satisfies the nonrecourse deduction safe harbor described
above, its allocations of nonrecourse deductions to A and B will be
deemed to be inaccordance with PIP. Alternatively, if AB Partnership
does not satisfy the nonrecourse deduction safe harbor described
above, its allocations of nonrecourse deductions to A and B will be
subject to the uncertainties of the PIP test.
For most practitioners, the most significant element of the nonrecourse
deduction safe harbor is the minimum gain chargeback requirement. To satisfy the
minimum chargeback requirement, if there is a net decrease inpartnership minimum
gain for a partnership taxable year, each partner must be allocated items of
partnership income and gain (including gross income) for that year equal to that
partner's share of the net decrease inpartnership minimum gain. This minimum gain
chargeback provision has the effect of making partners very sensitive to reductions
inpartnership nonrecourse debt.
Partnership Nonrecourse Deductions
Separate special rules also apply to losses and deductions attributable
to otherwise nonrecourse partnership liabilities ("partner nonrecourse liabilities") for
which a particular partner of the partnership bears the economic risk of loss (so-

called "partner nonrecourse deductions"). 29 Common circumstances which often
give rise to partner nonrecourse deductions include guarantees by partners of
otherwise nonrecourse partnership debt and cases where a partner itself makes an
otherwise nonrecourse loan to the partnership.
Under the regulations, partner nonrecourse deductions must be
allocated entirely to the partner that bears the economic risk of loss for a partner
nonrecourse liability.30 Further, if more than one partner bears the economic risk of

loss on a partner nonrecourse liability, any partner nonrecourse deductions
attributable to that liability must be allocated among the partners according to the
ratio inwhich they bear the economic risk of loss. 31 For this purpose, if partners bear
the economic risk of loss for different portions of a liability, each different portion is
32
treated as a separate partner nonrecourse liability.

For any partnership taxable year, the amount of partner nonrecourse
deductions generally equals the net increase during the year in minimum gain
attributable to the partner nonrecourse debt ("partner nonrecourse debt minimum
gain").33 In determining partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain and the net
29

See Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(i).

30

Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(2)(i)(1).

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(i)(2).
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increases or decreases in such minimum gain, rules similar to the rules described
above for "regular" partnership minimum gain will apply.34 Further, a comparable
minimum gain chargeback automatically applies.

5

As a result, if during a

partnership taxable year there is a net decrease in partner nonrecourse debt
minimum gain, any partner with a share of that partner nonrecourse debt minimum
gain as of the beginning of the year must be allocated items of income and gain
(including gross income) for the year (and, if necessary, for succeeding years) equal
to that partner's share of the decrease in the partner nonrecourse debt minimum
gain.36
Example 9. The facts are the same as in Example 8 above, except
that A personally guarantees the $80x nonrecourse debt encumbering
the office building. Under these facts, AB Partnership's $2.5x
depreciation deduction in year 9 will qualify as a partner nonrecourse
deduction because it is attributable to an otherwise nonrecourse
liability for which a partner (in this case, A) bears the economic risk of
loss. The $2.5x depreciation deduction, therefore, must be allocated
entirely to A. Partnership nonrecourse debt minimum gain at the end
of year 9, moreover, will equal $2.5x (the minimum amount of gain AB
Partnership would recognize if the partnership sold or otherwise
transferred the office building in a taxable transaction). Under the
partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain chargeback provision
described above, AB Partnership will be required to allocate this
minimum gain amount back to A upon a taxable disposition of the
office building.

34

Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(i)(3).

35

Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(i)(4).

36

Id.
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